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ABSTRACT 
The literature reports that patents are commonly seen as isolating mechanisms. But it also 
points that patents are of limited effectiveness against copying. The purpose of this paper is to 
identify why pharmaceutical firms file patent applications despite the well known limitations 
of patents as protective devices. A qualitative approach was used to investigate this topic, and 
the results are based upon six case studies of pharmaceutical organizations established in the 
United Kingdom. A common response on why firms engage in the patenting process was the 
long development time of a new product, and the costs associated with that. Thus, the main 
purpose of pursuing patents was to protect inventions from copying. In addition, our findings 
revealed that the motivations to patent also encompass their use: i) to deter entry, ii) to 
enhance appropriability conditions, iii) to secure royalty income, iv) to use in technology 
negotiations, v) to influence investors perception, vi) to signal to others, and vii) (apparently 
to a lesser degree) to incentivise researchers. 
Key words: patents, pharmaceutical industry, intellectual property, innovation, R&D 
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RESUMO 
A literatura relata que as patentes são normalmente vistas como mecanismos isolantes. Mas 
ela também indica que as patentes podem não ser muito efetivas contra a imitação. O objetivo 
deste trabalho é identificar o porquê das empresas farmacêuticas depositarem patentes apesar 
da reconhecida limitação destes instrumentos de proteção. A pesquisa utiliza uma abordagem 
qualitativa que consiste na realização de seis estudos de caso de empresas farmacêuticas que 
operam no Reino Unido. Para as empresas estudadas, a razão mais evidente para engajarem 
no processo de patenteamento foi o interesse em evitar a livre imitação de suas inovações, 
cujo tempo de desenvolvimento é normalmente longo e tem altos custos associados a ele. 
Além disso, também foi revelado que as patentes são utilizadas i) para desencorajar a entrada 
de outras empresas no setor ou no campo tecnológico de interesse, ii) para melhorar as 
condições de apropriação do esforço inovador, iii) para alavancar recursos através de 
licenciamento, iv) para usar em negociações tecnológicas, v) para influenciar a percepção dos 
investidores, vi) para dar sinais para o mercado, e vii) (aparentemente menos importante) para 
incentivar os pesquisadores. 
Palavras-chave: patentes, indústria farmacêutica, propriedade intelectual, inovação, P&D 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely known that firms pursue patents in order to stop imitative behaviour. 
However, there is evidence that patents are not perfect mechanisms against copying; their 
effectiveness may vary across industries (LEVIN; KLEVORICK; NELSON; WINTER, 
1987). As patents are not perfect in protecting against copying firms may have other 
motivations to file patents. Although the literature addresses other reasons firms pursue 
patents (e.g. to secure royalty income, to engage in technology negotiations) as far as we 
know there has not been any attempt to systematically investigate the motivations behind 
firms’ decisions to file patent applications. 
The purpose of this paper is to fill that vacuum by addressing the reasons firms in 
pharmaceuticals have to take out patents. Although there might be inter-industry differences 
in what concerns patenting activity we concentrated upon the pharmaceutical industry for as 
Levin et al. (1987), and Taylor and Silberston (1973) have shown, pharmaceuticals is one of 
the industries where patents play a major role as a mechanism to appropriate the returns from 
innovation. Moreover, Bosworth & Mahdian (1999) have detected that the pharmaceutical 
industry is where patents are most valued to increase the returns from innovation. 
The exploratory character of this research demanded a research method accordingly, 
and thus our analysis relies upon case studies of six pharmaceutical firms operating in the UK. 
The UK was the geographic area chosen to develop this study as it exhibits an intensive use of 
patents. Moreover, the pharmaceutical sector in the UK is one of the most active in the world 
and encompasses both local and foreign firms generating and marketing innovations.  
The next section presents the literature review. The third section describes the research 
method employed. We turn to the empirical findings in the fourth section, where a discussion 
of the results is also presented. Finally, we draw some conclusions. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Patents (or invention patents) concern technology-based inventions, and are granted 
when applications are clear about the fulfilment of the requisites for patentability: i) novelty 
(i.e., previously unknown), ii) inventive step (i.e., non-obvious to someone with ordinary 
skills in the technology area the invention fits in), and iii) industrial applicability. Thus, 
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patents are legal titles issued upon application which enable their holders (so called patentees) 
to enforce, for a limited time (in general, 20 years at most) and geographical area, exclusive 
rights over an invention by excluding others from making, using or selling it without their 
authorisation (CORNISH, 1999). 
Based upon the characteristics described above, the theoretical literature has made 
assumptions as to the way firms use patents. Although the empirical literature has provided 
insights into this issue, they do not always reconcile with the theory. For example, in theory 
patents are seen as impediments to rivals freely copy firm-specific resources that would 
otherwise lead to superior performance (RUMELT, 1987). However, empirical evidence 
suggests that the extent patents play that role varies across industries and firms (LEVIN et al., 
1987). More recent theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of patents has addressed that 
variability (e.g. WINTER, 2000) but the motivations underlying firms’ decisions to apply for 
patents are still unclear. Thus, the prime objective of this piece of research is to explore why 
firms use patents. 
One of the most revealing studies of firms’ perceptions about appropriability is that by 
Levin et al. (1987). They investigated typical conditions of appropriability in lines of business 
for US firms. The results of their survey suggest that the efficiency of the patent system is 
restricted. The authors found that process patents are the least effective mechanism of 
appropriability amongst those examined. Product patents were rated higher than process 
patents as a method of appropriability. In turn, secrecy was rated higher than process patents 
but lower than product patents. Their study also detected that lead-time, learning curve, and 
sales or service efforts are generally more effective than patents to recoup the expenses from 
Research and Development (R&D). 
Those results appear to confirm the UK findings of Taylor and Silberston (1973) that 
patents do not provide perfect appropriability. Levin et al. (1987) also detected that many 
patents can be circumvented, others are not so effective when subject to stringent legal 
requirement for proof that they are valid or are being infringed, and some innovations are 
difficult to patent. The effectiveness of patents as a method of appropriability thus seems to be 
limited, it being difficult to generalise how effective a patent can be. Moreover, there are 
inter-industry and inter-firms differences on the perception of how useful patents are, and that 
the incentives patents provide to increase the rate of innovation are very small in most of 
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industries (MANSFIELD, 1986). One exception is the pharmaceutical industry where Levin 
et al. (1987) detected that patents are rated as being more effective to appropriate the returns 
from innovation than all other means of appropriability. Their study however does not provide 
evidence as to why this is so, but the authors suggest that the discreteness and easy 
differentiability of the patentable subject matter of that industry help to develop a 
comparatively clear standard of assessment of a patent’s validity, and hence patents can be 
more easily defended if challenged. Although the reasons presented by Levin et al. (1987) are 
quite plausible, they are largely based on the authors’ personal opinions rather than based on 
the scrutiny of research investigation. Our paper therefore provides new insight into firms’ 
rationale to apply for patents. 
Even if patents do not provide perfect protection against copying, Mansfield (1986) 
found that the bulk of patentable inventions are patented and firms generally prefer to rely on 
patents than on trade secret protection. According to the author the reasons firms rely upon 
patent protection are manifold. Firstly, there has been an increase in perceived competition. 
Secondly, there has been a change in firms’ product mixes, with more sophisticated product 
lines, which are more likely to be patented. Finally, technological path involving analytical 
equipment has reached a stage where it has been easier for a rival to detect what innovators 
launch on the market. Again, these arguments were not derived from a particular investigation 
but rather from the author’s own perception. 
In a recent analysis on appropriability mechanisms used to reap the returns from 
innovation Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) surveyed managers in R&D laboratories within 
US manufacturing industry. They observed, again, that the effectiveness of patents varies 
across industries, but in the majority of manufacturing industries patents tend to be the least 
effective mechanism. One finding they came up with was that secrecy appeared to be more 
heavily employed across industries than it was previously, according to the results by Levin et 
al. (1987), and by Mansfield (1986). In addition, they detected that despite being judged low 
effective patents are still applied for as often as they were. According to Cohen et al. (2000) 
one reason for explaining that is the sufficient value patents add at the margin when they are 
used with other mechanisms. Although this argument resorts to their perception as opposed to 
research findings, what they really observed was that patents are mainly used to prevent 
copying. However, their results suggest that the second best reason to use patents is to block 
500 
MOTIVATIONS TO PATENT: THE CASE OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
REAd  EDIÇÃO 61 VOL. 14 Nº 3  SET/DEZ  2008  
 
competitors’ attempts to patent a closely related invention, by controlling a technology path 
which enables them to settle themselves in a specific market. 
Although the paper by Levin et al. (1987) does not explore the reasons why 
pharmaceutical firms apply for patents, their research provides evidence that for their sample 
firms from various industries patents are used not only to prevent duplication but also to 
secure royalty income. Moreover, recent work by Hall and Ziedonis (2001) has shown that 
patents are widely used in technology negotiations in semiconductors. Although firms in that 
industry may be more reliant on cross-licensing than are other firms this behaviour is not 
exclusive to that industry. Granstrand (1999), for example, has detected that Japanese firms 
from various industries often use cross-licensing. Pitkethly (2001), however, found that 
exercise to happen more often in Japan than in the UK, which means that the legal framework 
may contribute to the extent that firms engage in technology negotiations. In this piece of 
research we are not particularly interested in the extent that each motivation to patent induces 
firms to file applications (though this should be matter for further research). Thus, we do not 
envisage any harm in restricting our analysis to the UK. 
Possibly, there can be added to the above other motives why firms pursue a patent. For 
example, in studying a few Japanese corporations from various sectors Granstrand (2000) 
detected that patents can be used as reasonable indicators of inventive performance, and hence 
can be used and thus applied for as part of incentive structures for research workers. However, 
Duguet and Kabla (2000) found no robust evidence for this motivation in French 
manufacturing industry. In addition, Bosworth (2005) argues that patents are part of a firm’s 
appropriation strategy. In fact, some argue that patents can enhance appropriability conditions 
when used as complements to other appropriability mechanisms (GRAHAM; SOMAYA, 
2004).  
So, despite the limited effectiveness of patents as a means of protection against 
copying, under particular circumstances patents might be beneficial to firms. Therefore, when 
a firm takes out a patent it purchases an option (albeit on an asset the value of which is 
difficult to estimate) that can be defended in due course if necessary and that the cost of the 
option is not particularly expensive (GEROSKI, 1995). However, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no particular effort to systematically identify what options firms purchase 
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when they take out patents. Thus, there is still a gap in our knowledge, which this research 
aims to fill.  
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Although the business and economics literatures have made progress in extending our 
understanding about the role played by patents in enhancing firms’ competitiveness 
(GRANSTRAND, 2003), there are still some gaps in our knowledge, and a few of them of 
more basic nature. This paper, for example, explores the reasons pharmaceutical firms have to 
apply for patents. Although there might be inter-industry differences in what concerns 
patenting activity we concentrated upon the pharmaceutical industry because pharmaceuticals 
is one of the industries where patents play a major role. The United Kingdom was the 
geographic area chosen to develop this study due to the relevance of the UK pharmaceutical 
industry, and the tradition of the UK patent system. 
Although quite a few studies have addressed patent issues they have not provided a 
clear picture on the motivations firms have to pursue patents. We have thus selected a 
qualitative approach for this piece of work because it is able to provide a more in-depth 
analysis and to illustrate processes taking place (MAXWELL, 1998). Yin (1994) has 
suggested that the case study method is an appropriate approach when the investigation deals 
with a contemporaneous phenomenon, and when the research is focused on the ‘whys’ and 
‘hows’ of that event, which is particularly the purpose of this research. As suggested by 
Gillham (2000), semi-structured face-to-face interviews were used as the data collection tools. 
We also followed Kvale’s (1996) recommendations in collecting the information. The 
ultimate objective was to make the interview process to some extent open but not too vague, 
keeping the flexibility desired without missing the information that was being sought. 
The UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) produces yearly a ranking (also 
known as scoreboard) of firms that spend on Research and Development (R&D). At the time, 
there were 57 pharmaceutical firms. We randomly selected half firms listed in the 
pharmaceutical section of the UK R&D Scoreboard to approach, from which six firms were 
chosen. Although evidence from six case studies is difficult to generalize to the whole 
pharmaceutical sector, our sample firms seem to encompass a large variety that is expected to 
find in pharmaceuticals. Table 1 shows some attributes of our sample, and in addition we 
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should mention that our sample comprises firms at various stages of development and whose 
country of origin is not restricted to the UK. 
Table 1 – Interviewed Firms Profile 
Firm Number of Employees 
Number of 
Internal Patent 
Agents 
Number of 
Patents 
Sales 
(£ million) 
R&D 
(£ million) 
A 3,000 – 3,500 3 600 360 57 
B 100 – 150 Nil 9 7.8 3 
C 50 – 100  Nil 75 1 8.6 
D 100,000+ 104 15,000 17,200 2,600 
E 50,000+ 45 10,000 11,400 1,900 
F 1,000 – 1,500 6 NA 498 106 
 
Our evidence was collected mostly from interviews with the person in charge of 
patents in each firm. In particular because there is no source of secondary data that reports the 
prospects firms envisage when they file patent applications. The interviewees revealed for 
almost ninety minutes the firms’ reasons to pursue patents. Each interview was recorded and 
transcribed in order to undertake content analysis. Our analysis of the interviews revealed a 
pattern in firms’ responses that did not justify, at least for the purposes of this research, more 
effort to collect information from other pharmaceutical firms. The findings are thus presented 
and discussed in the next section. 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to understand firms’ rationale to pursue patents we also looked at their 
perception as to the effectiveness of the patent system. The interviewees, in general, could not 
envisage that pharmaceutical firms would continue to invest so heavily in R&D if patent 
protection did not exist. According to the interviews, it seems that the basic premise of the 
pharmaceutical industry is that in order to get a reasonable return from the investment in R&D 
a monopoly provided by patents is essential. Thus, the primary reason to apply for patents in 
pharmaceuticals is the fundamental rationale behind patent systems: to stop others (for a 
limited period) from freely copying patent holders’ inventions. The long development time 
(including clinical trials and regulatory review) and high development costs of a new product 
in the pharmaceutical industry were reasons mentioned to reinforce the relevance of patents in 
this industry. Patents, by granting exclusivity, help firms to earn premium prices enabling 
them to more effectively cover the costs of their research (including costs relating to products 
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that do not reach the market). That this is so in the pharmaceutical industry is completely 
consistent with previous studies (e.g., LEVIN et al., 1987; TAYLOR; SILBERSTON, 1973). 
As regards the importance of the subject matter in determining effectiveness, the 
interviewees reported that patent protection is important in pharmaceuticals because 
inventions once disclosed are simple to copy. Due to specificity the core product (drugs) of 
the pharmaceutical industry is relatively easy to protect from copying. A firm can stop others 
from copying because copies in pharmaceuticals are easy to detect due to technology and 
market structure. We were told that firms are able to easily detect whether another drug 
infringes the scope of their patents. These properties make patents a useful protective 
mechanism in this industry, and are in line with the reason mentioned by Levin et al. (1987) 
as to the easy differentiability of the patentable subject matter. 
Although interviewees agreed that the patent system in general is very important in 
pharmaceuticals, the effectiveness of individual patents in protecting property rights was 
reported to be variable. This was not unexpected on the basis of prior studies (e.g. LEVIN et 
al., 1987). According to the interviewees patent effectiveness depends upon the extent to 
which the property rights can be protected by the courts. Any difficulty in defending a patent 
in court comes down to: (i) weakness in the patent itself perhaps resulting from limited 
declared information substantiating its scope, making it liable to be challenged by competitors 
and/ or; (ii) the legal frameworks in some countries which restrict the extent to which a patent 
can be enforced. Moreover, it was revealed that patents may take too long to be issued which 
increases the uncertainty of the returns to a particular innovation. Although the respondents 
agreed that the litigation process itself is uncertain2, they complained that the usefulness of 
patents is somewhat limited in environments where little can be done to overcome 
infringement. Thereby, the legal system governing the markets in which firms operate 
considerably affects the effectiveness of patents to those firms. 
The above issues raised by the interviewees parallel Teece’s (1986: 287) concept of 
regimes of appropriability which “refers to the environmental factors, excluding firm and 
market structure, that govern an innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by an 
innovation”. As the author observed in a recent review of his seminal article, “imitability is a 
function of both legal impediments (…) and the inherent replicability of the technology” 
(TEECE, 2006: 1134). Although interviewees have argued that the weakness of a patent can 
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be a result of limited declared information in the patent application that substantiates its 
scope, information can be limited due to the own nature of knowledge embedded in the 
technology. As observed by Saviotti (1998), depending on the technology life cycle tacit 
knowledge can be more prevalent, and hence more difficult to demonstrate in a patent 
application. However, it might be that knowledge is strategically omitted to avoid excessive 
disclosure to competitors. But the latter behaviour implies that firms are also taking the risks 
of their applications not being accepted by patent examiners due to the lack of information. 
The limited effectiveness of patents was also justified because inventors may only be 
able to block competitors in terms of specific products rather than broad areas of technology 
in that there might be different ways of doing the same thing, or closely related products 
(‘relatives’ as one of the interviewees said) may not be covered by the patent. Often it seems 
that patents can make things more difficult for, but cannot completely stop, the competition. 
However, according to our interviews, the role of patents as an entry deterrent is pivotal in 
firms’ decisions to apply for patents. Firms, especially larger firms, reported that they take out 
and even hold portfolios of patents in order to undermine the technological development of 
competitors, delaying, or sometimes even blocking, access to a market niche. The 
effectiveness of this approach, however, was said to be variable because rivals may generate 
knowledge outside the domain of a patented invention. But this approach was said to be, on 
average, more efficient than relying on just one patent. As most pharmaceutical firms operate 
world-wide, they hold very large numbers of patents (up to as many as one per product per 
market), and in such circumstances it is only by managing the whole portfolio that they will 
generate the full benefit of patents and limit, but not necessarily stop, the operations of 
(potential) competitors. This result is in accordance with the findings of Bresnahan (1985) for 
the plain paper copier market, where the author detected Xerox’s attempt to patent as many 
features as possible of the copier technology. In turn, smaller firms we interviewed also 
signalled the possibility and interest in using patents as an entry deterrent, but they stated that 
they had insufficient funds to enable them to maintain ‘sleeping’ patents in force on a regular 
basis. They have to be more selective when they pay renewal fees. Yet, on occasion, even if 
patents are not perceived as perfect protective devices their role as entry deterrents justifies 
firms’ pursuit of patent protection.  
Our reporting firms indicated that they tend to keep things secret (either using trade 
secrets or pure secrecy) regardless of their decision as to the patentability of the invention. 
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Although the basic premise of patent protection is that patented knowledge will be disclosed 
to the world, and innovating firms agreed this is a drawback for their competitiveness, 
interviewees said that on occasion knowledge disclosed may not be enough to perform an 
invention. Know-how is always important and when the technology is in the very beginning 
of its life cycle other firms may have particular difficulty in copying the knowledge released. 
However, this does not happen very often and firms informed that their focus on secrecy is to 
assure that knowledge revealed in a patent application is disclosed to the extent that patent 
examiners will be convinced that a patent should be granted. Secrecy was said to be more 
prominent when it is difficult to police the invention (such as new processes or equipment). 
Interviewees also described that there might be situations where know-how is outdated 
quickly and in such cases it might not be worth seeking patent protection. 
It seems, therefore, that a combination of patents with other mechanisms is the way 
firms enhance the degree of appropriability over their innovations. This is corresponding to 
Graham and Somaya’s (2004) evidence for the US software industry, and the argument of 
Cohen et al. (2000) that patents can add sufficient value at the margin when combined with 
other mechanisms. We have thus observed that firms apply for a patent because it enhances 
appropriability conditions. The limited role of patents as protective devices can be moderated 
when other appropriability mechanisms are employed. We were often told that generally a 
combination of things is required to enhance firms’ appropriation. It was said that firms 
cannot rely solely on patents and expect that their success will be guaranteed. Overall, in 
order to reap the benefits from R&D they have to use a broad spectrum of elements that both 
underpin their sales and avoid other firms to step into their market niches. Although they were 
not asked to pin point which elements they were talking about sales force, secrecy, and brand 
(trademarks) were frequently mentioned by the interviewees. 
According to both theoretical (e.g. GALLINI; WINTER, 1985) and empirical (e.g. 
PITKETHLY, 2001) literatures the motivation to patent however does not derive only from 
the possibility of solely market an invention. Firms can appropriate the returns from their 
innovative effort by out-licensing their inventions as well. In fact, the possibility of out-
licensing a technology was reported to be taken into consideration by all the interviewed 
firms3. Moreover, the interviewees felt that they need to have their technology patented in 
order to out-license it. Our findings thus reconcile with the literature. However, prior 
literature has not explored further this motivation. In conducting our research we noticed that 
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smaller firms place more emphasis on this issue than do larger firms; it seems that out-
licensing may be more important to the former than to the latter. This might be a result of 
their lack of global production and distribution networks. As such their existence might 
depend more heavily upon their ability to convince other companies to in-license their 
technology. We were informed that if inventions are not well protected by patents it is less 
likely that larger pharmaceutical companies will in-license them. Although agreements might 
be made if a patent is still pending, smaller companies reported they tend not to even seek 
agreements for non-patented inventions. Not least, smaller companies may have more 
problems in covering the costs of clinical trials, regulatory review and product launch and as 
such may need to collaborate more often with larger companies. Their limited bargaining 
power in the absence of patent protection as well as their lack of control of complementary 
assets were said to put them at a disadvantage in negotiations with larger corporations. If they 
have an invention that is neither patented nor has a patent pending, they tend not to approach 
other companies; behaviour reinforced by the problems of maintaining non-disclosure 
agreements. Larger companies, who tend to operate world-wide, will on occasion consider 
out-licensing a technology (e.g., to access a particular market) but we were told that even to 
them, patent protection is a paramount requirement if they want to secure royalty income. 
In addition, we were told, patents are used as assets during cross-licensing 
negotiations. Although cross-licensing was not reported to be key to guarantee freedom to 
operate for the interviewed firms, as it is, for example, in semiconductors (HALL; 
ZIEDONIS, 2001; GRINDLEY; TEECE, 1997), it is an option that should be kept open, the 
interviewees said. Our interpretation of the interviewees opinions is basically that patents 
prove valuable in trading for technologies controlled by others, and thus even if an invention 
is not of particular interest to the firms, it may be patented in order to be used in acquiring 
more useful technology elsewhere. Although interviewees said that firms may engage in 
patent pools4 with other firms, our sample firms reported it does not happen very often to 
them. 
Adding to the above the companies in the sample considered patents to be at least 
partly useful as an incentive mechanism, though we were unable to judge whether patents 
were effective in this. None of the companies, however, reported that patents have a direct 
relationship with researchers’ salaries; behaviour that seems to differ from that found in 
Japanese firms (GRANSTRAND, 2000). For obvious reasons we could not identify whether 
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this is a sectoral difference or a cultural one. However, our findings revealed that, in the 
sample firms, patents are only one item amongst many used to measure the performance of 
human resources (others might include for example publications in academic journals). As 
there might be areas where it is easier to patent than others it was argued that it may be unfair 
to use crude number of patents as a performance indicator. In fact, there may be areas where 
the output of inventive activities will not be patentable at all, and hence the usefulness of 
patents as an incentive mechanism is limited. 
Whilst reasons to patent were mentioned in prior studies, they were not always reliant 
on factual data explored for that purpose. So, using a more rigorous approach our findings 
have confirmed most of what the literature previously addressed. In addition, our 
investigation has revealed two other reasons that, as far as we know, have been neglected in 
the empirical literature, which we list below. 
• To influence investors perceptions. By the time of the interviews, all sample firms, 
but one, were publicly traded in the stock market. Two of them, the smallest ones, 
indicated that they use patents to give confidence to investors and in turn to facilitate 
the financing of innovative activities. As further evidence of this, one of the 
companies in the sample devoted to patent issues almost one third of the content of 
its prospectus for admission to the official list of the London Stock Exchange. 
However, the prospect of holding a patent may, at least to smaller firms, go beyond 
funding opportunities because, according to the interviews, financiers may also offer 
information, advice, and credibility to the investment. 
• To signal to others. Following similar lines firms said that in holding patents they 
signal not only to investors but also to other institutional bodies (e.g, competitors, 
universities, and so on) who they are and where they may go technologically. The 
disclosure of their technological competence, although not necessarily in their own 
interest, may sometimes help in opening windows of opportunities (e.g., licensing, 
mergers, and acquisitions) of which they were not fully aware by the time a patent 
was applied for. But signalling is not associated only with business opportunities. It 
can impact, in at least two ways, on other firms’ behaviour. For example, a patented 
technology may divert other firms R&D direction because in following the same 
technological path as the already patented technology there are risks that resources 
will be wasted if a newer technology is not outside of the scope of previous patents. 
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Even if a patent is granted for the newer invention there is also the risk of patent 
infringement. And in this case, incumbent firms’ patent portfolio may signal the 
likely costs of an infringement. 
It was also indicated to us that there is a cost to obtaining and maintaining patents as 
well as tackling infringements. In fact we were told that there are cases where infringements 
may be ignored by patent holders, a particular reason for which (especially for smaller firms) 
was the relative cost of patent litigation as compared the benefits the enforcement of the 
patent would bring. According to the interviews, this depends to a large extent on the strength 
of a patent (a mixture of scope, and ease to defend in court) and on how close a patent is to 
the end of its life. In addition, the costs of taking out and maintaining patents were said to be 
easily overshadowed by the costs of patent litigation. One of the firms, for example, realised 
that it would be better off spending money in other activities that could strengthen its 
competitive position (e.g. R&D, marketing) rather than having equal expenses on patent 
litigation.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 In this paper we have explored why firms in the UK pharmaceutical industry pursue 
patents. The results arise from a series of interviews with appropriate personnel in six various 
sized firms. In total, the evidence provided by the six firms is perhaps a rather thin foundation 
upon which to make general statements, thus a more comprehensive, and representative, 
sample is needed, which we leave to future research. Nevertheless, some reflections seem to 
be in order. 
 Our findings revealed that although the main purpose of patents is to limit copying 
(and the effectiveness of patents in this appears to be determined largely by the enforcement 
climate and the ability of others to ‘invent around’ a patent), there are a number of additional 
reasons for firms to apply for patents. Although our results match prior studies, we also found 
supplementary information. We observed, at least to our sample firms, that patent applications 
are underpinned not only by the purpose of excluding others but also by the purpose of 
attracting others to a particular course of action. According to our findings, the motivations to 
patent encompass their use: i) to protect from copying, ii) to deter entry, iii) to enhance 
appropriability conditions, iv) to secure royalty income, v) to use in technology negotiations, 
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vi) to influence investors perception, vii) to signal to others, and viii) (apparently to a lesser 
degree) to incentivise researchers. 
 The theoretical literature has addressed patents as either isolating mechanisms 
(RUMELT, 1987) or appropriability mechanisms (TEECE, 1986). Although appropriation is 
to a large extent dependent on isolation our results suggest that firms also use patents as 
‘gathering mechanisms’ in order to appropriate the returns from innovation (e.g. attracting 
licensees, investors, and competitors to a deal). As such one theoretical implication of our 
findings is that the notion of appropriability mechanism suits better the role played by patents 
than does the notion of isolating mechanism.  
One managerial implication of our findings is that decision-making as to why to patent 
should encompass not only the potential protective benefit patents can bring but also the 
potential appropriative benefits. This does not mean that inventors should always file patent 
applications but rather that in deciding whether or not to patent the negative aspects of 
patenting should be compared with patents’ full potential benefits to the inventor that we have 
found to exceed protection. For instance, inventors may not be willing to disclose their 
technological knowledge to rivals but in doing so they may be opening windows of 
opportunities (e.g., licensing, mergers, and acquisitions) of which they are most often not 
fully aware. 
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